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Mackston v. State 124
(decided January 31, 1994)
The plaintiff brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
the application of the Judiciary Law section 221-i (formerly
section 221-g), 12 5 which provided for an unfavorable salary
differential between the judges of the City Court of the City of
Long Beach and the judges of the City Court of White Plains,
was unconstitutional and violative of his right to the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. 12 6 The Appellate Division, Second
Department held that Judiciary Law section 221-i was
constitutional and did not violate the plaintiff's right to equal
protection of the laws. 127
The plaintiff, a retired judge from the City Court of the City of
Long Beach, Nassau County, brought this suit some time after
the Unified Court Budget Act was enacted on April 1, 1977,128
seeking a declaratory judgment that Judiciary Law section 221-i
violated his equal protection right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12 9 Plaintiffs equal protection claim was based on

124. 200 A.D.2d 717, 607 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1994).
125. Judiciary Law § 221-i specifies the annual salaries for judges presiding
over city courts outside of New York City. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 221-i
(McKinney Supp. 1994).
126. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that: "No
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
127. Mackston, 200 A.D.2d at 717, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
128. The New York Court of Appeals in Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d
458, 462, 438 N.E.2d 397, 398, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (1982), noted that
the Unified Court Budget Act provided that "judicial personnel were
henceforth State employees and that, concordantly, they would be placed on
the State payroll on April 1, 1977" for the purpose of creating a state unified
court system that is "'unimpeded by artificiallocal boundariesand the diverse
competing needs of local governmental agencies.'" (quoting N.Y. JuD. LAW
§ 39 (McKinney 1988)).
129. Mackston, 200 A.D.2d at 717, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358. As of October
1, 1994, the annual salary for full-time judges in the City Court of Long Beach
was $86,000.00. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 221-i (McKinney Supp. 1994). In contrast,
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the fact that it provided higher annual salaries for judges of the
City Court of White Plains, Westchester County. 130 In addition
to the declaratory judgment, the plaintiff sought monetary relief,
consisting of retroactive pay increases including interest as well
as attorney's fees. 131 After finding that the state lacked any
rational basis for creating a statutory disparity of salaries between
the judges of City Courts of Long Beach and White Plains, the

trial court granted the plaintiff both the declaratory judgment and
the monetary relief sought. 132
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the appellate
division reaffirmed the New York Court of Appeals' well-settled
holdings in Cass v. State1 33 and Weissman v. Evans13 4 that, in
the annual salary for full-time judges in the City Court of White Plains was
$92,300.00.
130. Mackston, 200 A.D.2d at 717, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 717, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.
133. 58 N.Y.2d 460, 448 N.E.2d 786, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1983). In
Cass, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that a "State budgetary act
'will not be struck as violative of equal protection merely because it creates
differences in geographical areas.... As long as the State had a rational basis

for making such a distinction, it will pass constitutional muster under an equal
protection challenge.'" Id. at 463-64, 448 N.E.2d at 787, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
1002 (quoting Tolub v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 444 N.E.2d 1, 4, 457
N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (1982)).
134. 56 N.Y.2d 458, 438 N.E.2d 397, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1982). In
Weissman, the court of appeals held that there was no rational basis for the
disparate judicial salaries between the judges of Suffolk County District Court
and of Nassau County District Court because there was no geographic
distinction to justify such disparity in similar adjacent counties on Long Island.
Id. at 466, 438 N.E.2d at 400-01, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68. The court of
appeals stated the applicable rule that "while equal protection does not
necessarily require territorial uniformity... '[a] territorial distinction which
has no rational basis will not support a state statute.'" Id. at 464-65, 438
N.E.2d at 400, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (quoting Manes v. Goldin, 400 F. Supp.
23, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 1068 (1976)). The court further
noted that although geographical distinctions "'are not, in and of themselves,
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment... a state must demonstrate... that
the classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary but rests upbn some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy.'" Id. at 465, 438 N.E.2d at
400, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (quoting Levy v. Parker, 346 F. Supp. 897, 902
(E.D. La. 1972), aft'd, 411 U.S. 978 (1973)). See Weissman v. Bellacosa,
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evaluating the. "constitutionality of a statutorily created judicial
pay disparity among Judges of comparable courts," the
geographical distinctions between the areas where the courts are
situated must be based upon a rational basis.135 The court
reasoned that, based on government statistics, because the fulltime population and cost of living in White Plains were found to
be greater and substantially higher, respectively, than that of
Long Beach, there was a rational basis for the disparate salaries
on the basis of geography. 136 Specifically, the court noted that
between 1981 and 1982, the cost of purchasing a residential home
in White Plains was twice the amount of one on Long Island, and
the per capita property taxes were higher in White Plains than in
Long Beach. 137 Consequently, because it was more expensive to
live in White Plains than in Long Beach, the court held that
Judiciary Law section 221-i, which allows the geographically
disparate salaries between the judges of the City Court of Long
Beach and the judges of City Court of White Plains, was
supported by a rational basis, and therefore, constitutional. Thus,
the law did not violate plaintiff's right to the equal protection of
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 13 8
If this suit had been brought under the New York State
Constitution, article I, section 11, the outcome of the case would
probably have been the same. 13 9 In Burke v. Crosson,140 the
129 A.D.2d 189, 517 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1987) (extending the holding in
Weissman to include County Court Judges of Suffolk and Nassau Counties).
135. Mackston, 200 A.D.2d at 717-18, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
136. Id. at 718, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
137. Id.
138. Id. The court stated that "as long as any conceivable statement of facts
will support a classification by the Legislature, it cannot be held to be violative
of equal protection." Id. (citing Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 475
N.E.2d 95, 98, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (1984)).

139. Similar to United States Constitution, amendment XIV, § 1, the New
York State Constitution, article I, § 11 provides that "[n]o person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
140. 191 A.D.2d 997, 595 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 18, 1995 WL 50675 (N.Y. 1995).
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plaintiffs, county court judges of Onondaga County, brought suit
seeking to declare that section 221-d of the Judiciary Law14 1
deprived them of equal protection under both the New York State
and Federal Constitutions because it provided for a disparity in
salaries among the judges of different counties within New York
State. 142 The court held that "the significantly higher cost of
living in [various c]ounties provide[d] a rational basis for the
geographically disparate salaries ....
"143
144
In Barth v. Crosson,
the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, addressed the constitutionality of Judiciary Law
section 221-e. 145 The court upheld the salary differentials
between the family court judges of certain counties, but found
that the salary differentials in other counties violated their right to
equal protection under the federal and state constitutions. 14 6
Specifically, the court found that "because Onondaga, Oneida,
Erie and Monroe Countie§ are all located within the Fourth
Department," there was no rational basis for the geographically
disparate salaries of the family court judges within those
counties. 14 7 In regard to Onondaga, Oneida, Erie, and Monroe
Counties, the court noted that the duties, responsibilities, and
caseloads among the Family Court Judges were "comparable,"
while the differentials in the costs of living among those counties
were "insignificant." 148 Therefore, the court reasoned that,
because there was a
"'true unity
of... judicial
141. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 221-d (McKinney Supp. 1994) (listing the annual
salaries for some of the county court judges of New York State).
142. 191 A.D.2d at 997, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 273.

143. Id. at 998, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
144. 199 A.D.2d 1050, 607 N.Y.S.2d 200 (4th Dep't 1993).
145. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 221-e (McKinney Supp. 1994) (providing for
differing salaries between family court judges according to county).
146. Id. at 1050, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV;
N.Y. CoNST. art. I, § 11.
147. Barth, 199 A.D.2d at 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201. For example, the
salary for Oneida and Onondaga Counties, effective April 1, 1993, until
September 30, 1993, was $86,250.00. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 221-e. In contrast the
salary for Erie and Monroe Counties, effective April 1, 1993, was
$90,450.00. Id.
148. Barth, 199 A.D.2d at 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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interest... indistinguishable
by
separate
geographic
considerations [among the counties in question],"' the plaintiffs
14 9
were entitled to declaratory judgment.
However, the Burke court found the disparity in salaries
between the counties in the First and Second Departments 150 and
Onondaga and Oneida Counties to be constitutional. 15 1 The court
reasoned that, because of the "higher cost of living in those first
and second department counties, as compared to Onondaga and
Oneida counties, [there was] a rational basis for the
152
geographically disparate salaries."
As Mackston illustrates, state and federal constitutional
geographical distinctions are not limited to differences between
counties and appellate departments, but also between the cities
within the counties, as well as within the appellate departments.
Furthermore, even if the duties, responsibilities, and caseloads
among the city court judges were shown to be comparable, a
rational basis for geographically disparate salaries may still be
found where it is demonstrated that a significant differential in
population and cost of living exists. 153 Thus, if the Mackston
case had been brought under the New York State Constitution,

149. Id. (quoting Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458, 463, 438 N.E.2d
397, 399, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1982)).
150. The First and Second Departments consist of the Bronx, Dutchess,
Kings, Nassau, Orange, Queens, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester
counties. Id.
151. Id. at 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
152. Id.
153. See Edelstein v. Crosson, 187 A.D.2d 694, 590 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d
Dep't 1992). In Edelstein, the plaintiffs, six county court Judges from
Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties, submitted evidence that
demonstrated the similarity between their caseloads and the caseloads of the
Westchester County Court Judges, while the defendants submitted evidence
that demonstrated that the population and the cost of living in Westchester
County were higher than in Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties. Id. at
696, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The court held that there was a rational basis for
the disparate salaries where the average home in Westchester was sold in late
1987 for $361,094 while at the same time, an average home in Orange
County sold for $132,050. By contrast, in Rockland County the average home
sold for $185,000 in 1988, and in Dutchess County, for $149,270 in 1989. Id.
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rather than the Federal Constitution, it is likely that the outcome
would have been the same.
1 54
People v. Jones
(decided May 9, 1994)

The defendant claimed that the prosecutor failed to create a
prima facie example of race discrimination required to trigger a
Batson inquiry. 155 The use of peremptory challenges by counsel
for the purpose of excluding jurors on the basis of race is a
violation of .the Equal Protection Clause of both the United
States 156 and New York State 157 Constitutions. 158 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial court's decision
to seat two challenged jurors based on the court's finding that the
race neutral explanations given by defense counsel for exclusion
59
were pretextual. 1
During jury selection for the trial, the prosecutor claimed
defense counsel was using his peremptory challenges1 60 to
remove venirepersons from the jury panel due to the fact that
they were white. 16 1 In response, defense counsel provided race
neutral explanations to the court for his strikes.1 62 However,
although defense counsel's explanations were facially race
154. 204 A.D.2d 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d 640 (2d Dep't 1994).
155. Id. at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (referring to a test used for prompt
resolution to objections to peremptory challenges found in the famous case of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
157. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 states in relevant part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
158. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
159. Id.
160. The permitted amount of peremptory challenges, challenges made
without a showing of reason, are permitted in state criminal cases is provided
by N.Y. CIM.PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993 &Supp. 1994).
161. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
162. Id.
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